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Abstract
Previous scholarship has described how members of Congress struggle 
to attract media attention. The Speaker of the House, however, is uniquely 
positioned to drive media agendas. That position may be conditioned though 
by the framework in which the Speaker operates, shocks to the system of 
leadership in the House, and the process of legislating. We inquire into the 
conditions under which the Speaker of the House receives increased or 
decreased attention from newspapers, network newscasts, and cable news-
casts. We also examine the contraction and expansion of the gap between 
levels of presidential and Speaker coverage. We find that Speaker coverage 
is often shaped by increases in House polarization, changes in which party 
holds the position, Speaker scandal, and turning bills into laws.
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The public’s understanding of the process of governing is largely shaped by 
what is presented to them through the media. Americans have neither the 
time nor the desire to follow each and every development taking place in the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. They therefore delegate infor-
mation gathering to newspapers, television networks, and increasingly the 
Internet. We know though that newspapers have only so many inches of col-
umn space and that television news programs have only so many minutes to 
which they devote attention to what is taking place in Washington. Some 
issues will get covered and some will not. Some individuals will get covered 
and some will not. On a daily basis, Americans will receive information on a 
small fraction of the developments taking place in the federal government, 
and what comprises that fraction will be shaped not by randomness, but 
instead by the choices journalists make and the norms journalists have devel-
oped over time concerning what is newsworthy and what is not (Graber, 
2010). One such norm is that the President gets covered with great intensity, 
while members of Congress struggle to gain attention.
The President is a single individual with a single agenda, while Congress 
is made up of 535 individuals with at some times similar and at other times 
wildly cross-cutting agendas. Executive action is seen as contained, decisive, 
and often dealing with outputs, while congressional action is often sprawling, 
drowning in detailed processes, dealmaking, and dealbreaking. It is no sur-
prise to many media scholars, therefore, that the President gains the attention 
of the media (Edwards & Wood, 1999). Although, to some extent, increases 
in media fragmentation and negativity in coverage may have weakened the 
President’s grasp on setting the agenda of journalists (Cohen, 2008, 2009), 
the President still receives more coverage than Congress does, longer cover-
age than Congress does, and more prominently featured stories than Congress 
does (Graber, 2010). When Congress is covered, said coverage often lacks 
coherent narratives over time (Hess, 1991). The legislative branch is often 
only able to garner media attention when members of Congress are cam-
paigning (Robinson & Appel, 1979). Additionally, Congress is often por-
trayed much more negatively than the executive branch (Robinson & Appell, 
1979; Rozell, 1996). Individual members do receive coverage (Patterson & 
Caldeira, 1990), but said members are forced, as Jamieson (1988) describes, 
to compete for what is left over after the President has received his share of 
attention from the media. Members compete with those in their chamber and 
they compete with those across chambers (a battle, as Hess, 1986, notes, that 
benefits a handful of “insider” senators more often than not). Individual 
members are also forced to find a way to place themselves amidst the inco-
herent narrative (Hess, 1986), to be a media entrepreneur advancing their 
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own narrative (Kedrowski, 1996), or to fill a role (preferably a powerful one) 
toward which the media might gravitate (Hess, 1986; Kuklinski & Sigelman, 
1992; Squire, 1988). Not every member of Congress is created equal though 
in this battle over scraps of attention from journalists. Some members of 
Congress are, as Arnold (2004) puts it, “consequential” (p. 2). Clearly, one of 
the most consequential individuals in Congress is the Speaker of the House.
Since the reforms of the 1970s that weakened the committee system and 
strengthened leadership powers, the Speaker of the House has become 
increasingly meaningful in terms of shaping the legislative process and the 
outcomes that flow forth (Rohde, 1991; Sinclair, 1998). The Speaker makes 
decisions as to what bills are heard in committees and what bills make it to 
the floor for votes. The Speaker ensures that the day to day operations of the 
House run as smoothly as possible (and is called upon when said business 
runs into roadblocks). Moreover, the Speaker represents the philosophy and 
actions of the majority party in his or her chamber. In essence, therefore, 
Speakers balance legislative, institutional, and partisan agendas in a way few 
other individuals within Congress do (Green, 2010). This balancing act gives 
Speakers an advantage in gaining a place within the aforementioned congres-
sional narrative. Such power and responsibility should be especially attrac-
tive to journalists given their tendency to seek out the most authoritative 
sources possible (Sigal, 1986). We should expect the Speaker to face and 
attract the national media spotlight in a way that the typical member of 
Congress does not (Cook, 1989; Hess, 1986).
We also know that Speakers, like many other leaders, attempt to pull the 
spotlight towards themselves. For the past several decades, Speakers have 
become increasingly cognizant of the role the media might play in setting the 
stage for legislative victory and political popularity. Winning the competition 
for coverage (against fellow members of the House and Senate as well as 
against the President) is essential for Speakers to hold onto and wield power 
in their chamber, as well as win ideological and legislative battles across 
chambers and branches. Winning the competition might also, as Sellers 
(2010) describes in examining motivations to shape coverage and agendas, 
help “affect the progression and outcome” (p. 3) of policy debates taking 
place not just within government, but in the public at large. Leaders like the 
Speaker want coverage because it allows them to set agendas within Congress, 
increase issue salience amongst fellow members of Congress as well as the 
electorate, and move the debate forward once items are on the agenda (Sellers, 
2010). Such media victories not only potentially get policy ideas turned into 
laws in the short term, but they may also have long-term benefits in terms of 
positive evaluations for both the politician shaping the coverage as well as 
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said politician’s party (Sellers, 2010). As Peters (1990) notes, Speaker Tip 
O’Neill felt from the beginning of his speakership that nurturing his image 
was an important task alongside managing the House or winning votes, and 
that completing such a task might set him apart from previous Speakers. 
Following the elections of 1980 that turned Democrats out of power in both 
the White House and the Senate, O’Neill embarked on a strategy to make 
himself more public than before (Cook, 1989). Speaker Wright was known 
for holding regular briefings in his office that allowed journalists access not 
just to him but also to other key Democrats in his caucus (Cook, 1989). Even 
after taking power in the House, Speaker Gingrich continued the public mes-
sage building and disseminating strategies that helped him rise to the speak-
ership (Sinclair, 2000), so much so that he made himself “a symbol of the 
Republican program and a natural object of Democratic attack” (Peters, 
1999, p. 59), perhaps hastening his downfall. Speaker Pelosi recognized a 
changing media landscape and as such, attempted not only to promote her 
efforts in traditional locations such as newspapers and network television sta-
tions, but also to manage her message in more modern fora like cable net-
works, talk radio, the blogosphere, and late night comedy programming 
(Peters & Rosenthal, 2010). Speakers are not just solo actors in the struggle 
to gain publicity for their efforts; they often also play a key role in broader 
party promotional campaigns (Sellers, 2010).
These efforts, however, are not guaranteed to draw a constant spotlight. 
The speakership appears to be, as Harris (1998) and Highton (2002) note, 
more public a position than it once was. As Cook (1989) and Kedrowski and 
Gower (2009) illustrate, this has translated into more media attention for 
leaders in general when compared to rank and file members and for specific 
Speakers like Gingrich and Pelosi when compared to similar Speakers in the 
past. Speakers may, like other party leaders, attempt to “win” media attention 
(Sellers, 2002), but such attempts do not guarantee victories. The ability of 
this more public speakership to translate into attention from traditional 
sources of information such as newspapers and television newscasts may be 
conditioned by the situations in which Speakers operate and the norms that 
shape what journalists are more or less likely to cover. The purpose of this 
research is to determine under what circumstances the media focus more or 
less of their attention on the Speaker of the House. More broadly, we are also 
asking what about the Speaker might capture the attention of journalists. Is 
coverage shaped by the potentially partisan and polarized framework in 
which a Speaker operates within government? Is coverage shaped by shocks 
to the system of governing in the House, such as changes in who holds power 
and who participates in scandalous behavior? Or, is coverage driven by 
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legislative outcomes within government and potential flashpoints within the 
process of turning bills into laws? Moreover, given the competition for cover-
age amongst politicians, we inquire into how the framework, shocks to the 
system, and the legislative process might explain the ever-expanding and 
contracting gap between presidential coverage and Speaker coverage over 
time, allowing for a characterization of moments at which the Speaker 
appears to be more of a rival to the President for the media’s attention.
To answer such questions and explain what conditions the ebb and flow of 
media attention paid to the Speaker of the House, we proceed in the following 
manner. We begin with a discussion of the lessons existing research has taught 
us about political coverage in general, namely the norms that journalists uti-
lize to determine what ends up in print or on air and what does not. We specu-
late as to which elements of the speakership might meld with these coverage 
norms, causing media attention toward the Speaker to rise and fall over time. 
We look at national newspaper, network television coverage, and cable televi-
sion coverage of the Speaker over three-plus decades. Through a series of 
error correction models examining the volume of print and broadcast stories 
of Speakers from 1977 through 2010, we find that the media spotlight is best 
explained by polarization within the House, changes in which party holds 
power, Speaker scandal, and the extent to which bills become laws.1 We also 
use our battery of predictors to examine the ever-intense but often fleeting (at 
least in terms of volumes of coverage) rivalry for attention between the 
President and the Speaker as well. We again discover that polarization, changes 
in power, Speaker scandal, and lawmaking are essential to explaining when 
the Speaker fares better or worse in competition for the spotlight.
Explaining Speaker Coverage:  
Framework, Shocks, and Legislating
It is no surprise, given the aforementioned benefits in terms of policy, party, 
and popularity, that Speakers would attempt to be media entrepreneurs and win 
coverage. Given the power inherent to the position, Speakers should be suc-
cessful at this entrepreneurism above and beyond the average member’s 
attempts (Kedrowski, 1996). Such attempts do not always dovetail nicely with 
a world in which those covering Congress may have a wholly different concep-
tion of what is newsworthy and what is not. Politicians seeking to get their 
messages across to the general public might hope that the media act, as 
Groeling (2010) describes, like a “conveyer belt faithfully delivering the views 
of elites” (p. 45), but such hopes are often confounded by the beats journalists 
keep and the norms journalists adopt to determine what is newsworthy and 
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what is not (Althaus, 2003). Research on the congressional beat notes, that 
like many other political beats, coverage of Congress as a whole is generally 
driven by “exciting, novel, or controversial topics” and not “recurrent com-
plex and mundane problems” on the agenda (Graber, 2010, p. 249). This type 
of coverage of Congress makes sense given broader journalistic tendencies 
to focus on novelty, familiarity, and conflict, while simultaneously often 
neglecting to follow major problems specifically and public policy in general 
(Graber, 2010; Groeling, 2010; Patterson, 2000). Speakers tirelessly work to 
make themselves, their positions, and their party fit the norms journalists 
follow; this work may be undermined or enhanced, we argue, by three fac-
tors: the presence or absence of partisan and ideological conflict within the 
House or the broader political system (a battery of variables we call frame-
work), shocks to the system of governing in the House and/or by the Speaker 
(variables we call shocks), and legislative action on the part of the House and 
Congress more broadly (variables we call legislating). We now explain more 
specifically why and how this might be the case.
Framework and the Speaker
We know that Speakers have a wide variety of tools at their disposal to move 
legislation (and their own interests) forward, but we also know that to some 
extent, their ability to move strategically is either enhanced or undermined 
by the state of debate within their caucus and the opposing caucus, as well as 
the length of the leash the public has given Speakers to govern and wield 
power. As discussed earlier, we know that Speakers attempt to draw the spot-
light toward them, but such efforts run into roadblocks like those discussed 
by Patterson (1994) and Weaver (1972), who argue that the media are 
increasingly interested in the strategic (and adversarial) “game” taking place 
between politicians attempting to advance their agendas. In essence, Speaker 
efforts to get attention and get things done should be affected (for better or 
worse) by similar efforts undertaken by others in power. This clash of efforts 
fits well with established media norms of seeking to cover conflict and sub-
sequent negativity (especially when it comes to Congress, according to 
authors like Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1998; Rozell, 1994; and Tidmarch & 
Pitney, 1985). We should expect this push and pull between Speakers and the 
broader framework to potentially serve as fodder for a media interested in 
how key players like the Speaker act and interact. We anticipate the frame-
work potentially driving Speaker coverage in three ways: through polariza-
tion within the House over which the Speaker runs, through divided 
government between control of the speakership and the President, and 
through divided government between control of the House and Senate.
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One element of the strategic framework in which Speakers operate that 
should be of interest to the media is the potential for greater ideological 
extremity in the House leading to deeper divides (and as such, interesting and 
newsworthy conflict). Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006) illustrate how the 
media consistently express interest in covering polarizing individuals writ 
large. We also know that the media have a distinct interest in extremism within 
Congress; as Kuklinski and Sigelman (1992) show, extremists within the 
Senate get more attention than their more moderate counterparts. We argue 
that moments of conflict and moments of extremism have the potential to 
draw Speakers into the discussion. Speakers will be forced to manage extrem-
ism or carry the flag for their side against the ever-polarizing opposition. 
Given the media’s continued and increasing attention to political gamesman-
ship and the potential for Speakers to either stoke the flames of ideological 
contention or serve as a force to bring legislators with differing viewpoints 
together to solve problems, we might expect situations in which parties and 
ideologies are prone to clash to be moments in which Speakers are the subject 
of newspaper and television coverage. One way we might measure this is to 
capture the extent to which parties in a chamber act differently (i.e., vote dif-
ferently). When parties act together, the potential story being told might not 
spark coverage of Speakers in the way that we might expect if the parties were 
strongly opposed and combative. The further apart the parties are ideologi-
cally, the easier it might be to cover Speakers in a way that fits existing narra-
tives about conflict, gamesmanship between partisan spokesmen (one of 
whom often is the Speaker), the general negativity in politics, and the inability 
for Congress to accomplish goals in the face of partisan bickering. We expect 
polarization to bring with it added attention to the Speaker. We include in our 
models a variable capturing polarization between the two parties; House 
Polarization is the distance between the average House Republican and the 
average House Democrat on Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate spectrum. 
Data on party averages is available through Poole and Rosenthal’s database.2
We are also interested in how what is going on between the House and the 
rest of the federal government might shape media attention paid to Speakers. 
One path by which other branches might drive coverage of the Speaker is 
through the presence of divided government. Harris (1998) notes that divided 
government in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have spurred media oppor-
tunities for Speakers past. These opportunities might be further exacerbated 
in times when control of the House, the Senate, and the White House seems 
increasingly fluid (or much more fluid than it was when Democrats had a 
stranglehold on Congress). When parts or the whole of Congress are con-
trolled by a different party than the White House, the potential exists for 
highly visible (and highly interesting from a media perspective) conflict in 
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the process of lawmaking. We know that coverage of Congress in general is 
often laden with discussion of interbranch and intrabranch sparring (Groeling, 
2010; Morris & Clawson, 2005). Those individuals driving that conflict (or, 
at times, coming together across partisan divides to compromise) might be 
drawn into the spotlight as a result. They have the potential to become natural 
foils against hostile and powerful partisan opposition, be it on the other side 
of Congress or in the White House (Groeling, 2010). The media, whose inter-
est in Congress is often driven by the negativity inherent in conflict, should 
pick up on the flashpoints between parties within and across branches. In 
times where the House and the White House or the House and the Senate are 
controlled by the same party, such potential for conflict is quelled to a larger 
extent. In such situations, Speakers might, as Groeling (2010) puts it in his 
discussion of congressional members of the presidential party, spend “life in 
the shadows” (p. 97). We conceive of divided government in two distinct 
ways in our models. We include a variable (House/Presidency Division) to 
account for quarters in which a Speaker’s party affiliation was different from 
that of the President’s, expecting that these time periods will be ones in which 
Speakers will receive higher levels of attention. We also include a variable 
(House/Senate Division) to capture quarters in which a Speaker’s party affili-
ation was different from that of the Senate Majority Leader’s. We expect that 
this type of division may create newsworthy tension between the House and 
the Senate in the process of creating legislation passable in both chambers.
Shocks and the Speaker
The decisions the media make in separating what to cover and what to ignore 
are driven in part by “economic pressures to generate large audiences” 
(Graber, 2010, p. 97). The conflict in polarization and divided government 
(and the strategy the Speaker utilizes in dealing with this framework) may be 
one such way to draw in the public, but it is not necessarily the only way. 
Novelty surrounding the speakership may provide another path for journal-
ists to pursue in their effort to build an audience. New situations that shock 
the system in which the House (and, in turn the Speaker) operates may move 
the media’s attention toward the Speaker. We conceive of three types of 
shocks that the media might find novel: changes in party control, Speaker 
scandals, and scandals involving multiple members of the House.
Changes in which party holds the speakership might bring with them 
changes in levels of Speaker coverage. We should expect the idea of change to 
be inherently interesting to a political media looking for new angles on old 
stories. Whereas a Speaker of one party stepping aside for a new Speaker of 
the same party might often be a situation in which continuity in leadership 
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style or partisan agenda reigns, a change in which party runs the House is 
guaranteed to be historic in nature and assuredly brings with it the novelty 
journalists seek to present. Journalists, pundits, and politicians alike will won-
der what a new Speaker representing control of the House by a different party 
will bring to the position, to policy development, and to the House itself. They 
will speculate as to how a new type of control and leadership will affect other 
major players within government. We also might expect a certain amount of 
biographical and historical coverage capturing who this new Speaker is, help-
ing familiarize the public with an individual who has been elevated to become 
a major player that will be sure to be a part of future coverage, building a 
foundation of narratives on which coverage of Speakers over subsequent quar-
ters could be justified. As such, we would expect these historic changes in the 
speakership to drive coverage upward. We include a dichotomous variable 
(Change In Control) in our models that account for quarters in which control 
of the House changes hands from one party to the other.
We are also interested in how potentially scandalous actions of both 
Speakers and other legislators might shape coverage of Speakers. Scandals fit 
well with the search for novelty, conflict, and negativity intrinsic to the 
media’s approach to politics in modern times. We know that, in general, scan-
dal coverage has increased over time (Lichter & Amundson, 1994). We also 
know that ethics issues might drive additional coverage of those specifically 
caught up in said issues (Arnold, 2004). Our models examine links between 
scandal and Speaker coverage in two ways, looking for effects of scandals 
directly involving the Speaker and scandals involving fellow House mem-
bers. We expect scandals in general to push the spotlight onto leaders like the 
Speaker. When Speakers themselves are caught up in scandals, we should 
expect the media to pounce on the story, questioning how the scandal will 
affect the Speaker’s ability to lead and if the Speaker will be able to continue 
to hold onto his or her position. When members of Congress are caught up in 
scandals, Speakers are often times forced to react, be it through speaking out 
or taking steps to reprimand those scandalized. We include a dichotomous 
variable (Speaker Scandal) in each model that measures quarters in which a 
Speaker is the subject of a House Ethics Committee investigation.3 Also 
included in each model is a dichotomous variable (House Scandal) measur-
ing the presence or absence of a scandal that affects the careers of multiple 
members within the House simultaneously.4
Legislating and the Speaker
As Patterson (1994) argues, in the wake of the media’s shift to covering strat-
egy over substance, Americans still do want to know about issues and want to 
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know how outcomes will affect them. While this strain of coverage may have 
declined, it has not disappeared. We know it has not disappeared on other 
realms, such as campaign coverage (Patterson, 1994). We also know it has not 
disappeared from the attention afforded to Congress in general by journalists; 
Hess (1991), Morris and Clawson (2005), Robinson and Appel (1979), and 
Tidmarch and Pitney (1985) show that parliamentary action does get attention 
from the mass media. Introduction of legislation (including sponsorship and 
cosponsorship), committee hearings and testimony, debates on the House and 
Senate floor, final votes, and conference committees all draw coverage in 
varying amounts. Media coverage is unlikely to take the form of a “play-by-
play” mentality describing legislative developments as they happen; instead, 
the media seem interested in legislative activity that brings with it a sense of 
finality, explaining what has been done (Graber, 2010). The extent to which 
Speakers take action and bring about results (feeding the appetite for coverage 
of legislative outcomes, as it were) might shape the extent to which they 
receive attention from print and television media. Results, we argue, might be 
measured in two ways: turning bills into laws and standing up for decisions 
made by overriding vetoes.
One set of actions on the part of fellow legislators that potentially affects 
media attention afforded the Speaker is the movement of legislation through 
the legislative process to completion. A productive Congress might garner 
attention for its leaders, like the Speaker, in ways that an unproductive Congress 
might not. Legislative outputs could provide a steady stream of fodder that the 
media might dissect, as well as fodder for assessing the performance of a 
Speaker. We therefore include a variable (Bills Become Laws) that captures the 
number of pieces of legislation that were signed into law during each quarter. 
Archival searches of the Thomas legislative database were utilized to count 
quarterly levels of bill passage.5
Some rare parliamentary actions might also spur the media to pay atten-
tion to the role leaders like the Speaker are playing, while also fitting neatly 
into the journalistic norms of conflict and novelty discussed earlier. One such 
type of action we feel might draw the spotlight of newspapers and television 
onto the Speaker is successful attempts to counteract the power of the presi-
dency through veto overrides. Overrides allow Congress to strike back 
against the President and reaffirm the power of the legislative branch in the 
legislative process. Overrides are rare, but when they do occur they not only 
create a new law, but they also send a signal as to the ability of a leader such 
as the Speaker to marshal his or her chamber to act decisively. We might 
expect the infrequent and conflict-laden nature of these successful attempts 
to be newsworthy. We include a measure (Overrides) to account for moments 
per quarter when Congress is able to override a veto.6
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What Speakership Coverage Looks Like
We begin our inquiry into explaining the extent to which the media spotlight 
is on the Speaker with a quick overview of what media coverage of the 
Speaker of the House looks like across the past 30-plus years. For our pur-
poses here (and to be able to speak about attention from the media in the 
broadest sense possible), we conceive of media coverage taking three primary 
forms in recent history: newspaper coverage, network television coverage, 
and cable television coverage. Internet coverage of Speakers may have taken 
off in recent years, but newspaper and television attention have been a con-
stant presence across multiple decades. Focusing on traditional media allows 
us to characterize the predictors of coverage in a more comprehensive manner 
over time. We start with a look at how print media has covered the Speaker 
since the late 1970s. We have chosen to examine coverage from both The 
Washington Post and The Associated Press, allowing us to examine attention 
afforded the Speaker in a major national publication as well as by a news 
agency that provides copy that reaches national, state, and local publications. 
To gather the quarterly volume of this newspaper coverage of Speakers, we 
use the Lexis-Nexis media database.7 For Post coverage, stories in which the 
full name of a Speaker was included in the list of the Post’s story subjects (via 
the Lexis-Nexis story subject search) were counted as stories about said lead-
ers. For AP coverage, stories in which the Speaker’s name appears in the 
headline or the lead paragraph (via the Lexis-Nexis HLead search) were 
counted as stories about said leaders.8
Our series of newspaper stories on the Speaker begin in 1977 and run 
through 2010. This choice is driven by the depth of the Lexis-Nexis database 
when it comes to The Washington Post, which dates back to 1977 online. This 
also explains the choice of the Post over comparable national papers like the 
New York Times, which does not have stories on Lexis-Nexis going back 
further than the early 1980s. We collect AP stories back to 1977 as well for 
the sake of comparability between series. Figure 1 captures coverage of the 
Speaker of the House in The Washington Post and The Associated Press.9
We see in general in Figure 1 that a quarter in which the number of stories 
rises over 100 is relatively rare, happening several times between early 1982 
and early 1985 during the O’Neill speakership, in late 1987 and early 1988 
during the O’Neill and Wright speakerships, during the second quarter of 1989 
at the end of the Wright and beginning of the Foley speakerships, every quar-
ter between 1995 and 1998 during the Gingrich speakership, during the sec-
ond quarter of 1999 and 2000 during the Hastert speakership, during the first 
two quarters of 2007 at the start of the Pelosi speakership, and a handful of 
times between 2009 and 2010 near the end of the Pelosi speakership. In The 
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Washington Post, Speaker coverage is at its highest during the first quarter of 
1995 (where it increases to nearly 6 times the quarterly average of 87). As for 
The Associated Press, Speaker coverage is also at its highest in the first quarter 
of 1995 (where it peaks at 7 times the quarterly average of 65).
We also note the incredible similarity between The Washington Post and 
The Associated Press coverage of the Speaker of the House. The series are 
correlated at .92, suggesting patterns of reporting on the Speaker are incred-
ibly similar for a major national publication as they are for a news agency 
with reach across nearly 2,000 papers of all sizes. We do see some points at 
which the Post and AP diverge, however. Coverage of Speaker Tip O’Neill’s 
earliest days in office was much more prevalent in The Washington Post than 
it was by The Associated Press. Coverage of Speaker Wright’s final quarter 
and Speaker Foley’s first quarter peaked more highly with the AP than it did 
with the Post. Attention paid to the start of the Gingrich and Pelosi speaker-
ships was also generally higher in the Post than it was with AP. We now move 
to an examination of Speaker television coverage.
When it comes to television coverage of the Speaker of the House, we rely 
on the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.10 Overall, the Archive includes 
abstracts of news programs run by ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, FOX, PBS, 
MSNBC, CSPAN, CNBC, and Univision. Examining Speaker coverage on 
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Newspaper coverage of the Speaker of the House,
1977-2010
Post Coverage AP Coverage
Figure 1. Note: x axis = time; y axis = number of newspaper stories.
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all networks in total across decades proves somewhat problematic however, 
given that the Vanderbilt archive begins only in the mid 1990s to include 
cable networks (well after the birth of CNN) and does not cover these net-
works above and beyond CNN until the mid 2000s. We therefore create two 
television coverage variables: Speaker Network Coverage and Speaker Cable 
Coverage. To capture Speaker Network Coverage, we chose one longstand-
ing network (ABC) at random. Our series of ABC newscasts with stories on 
Speakers begins in 1977 and runs through 2010. We choose to begin with 
1977 to create a series of comparable length to the newspaper series dis-
cussed earlier. When it comes to Speaker Cable Coverage, CNN was chosen 
both because of its more evenhanded reputation (especially in comparison to 
the reputations MSNBC and FOX News have taken on over time) and because 
over 15 years of CNN story topics exist in the Archive (giving us a noticeably 
longer series than we would have had we examined other cable news options). 
Vanderbilt’s archive chronicles CNN’s newscast running from 6:00 to 7:00 
p.m. Eastern time. Our series here runs from late 1995 through the end of 
2010 due to the aforementioned data constraints.
In conducting both of these searches, we sought out mentions of the last 
name of Speakers in news abstracts.11 Human coders validated the data col-
lection process, taking steps to weed out any stories that may not have dealt 
with Speakers but instead with other individuals with the same last names. 
The abstracts searched include those for news segments, program introduc-
tions, specials, anchor “good night” segments, and evening news; these cat-
egories are options offered by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive itself. 
The two series of television coverage of the Speaker in Figure 2 track the raw 
number of ABC and CNN newscasts with stories in which the Speaker 
appeared, was discussed, or was quoted per quarter.
We see that network news coverage of the Speaker remains near or slightly 
below average (average for ABC being 9 newscasts per quarter) for several 
quarters in the late 1970s during the O’Neill speakership. Across much of the 
early to mid 1980s, we then consistently see quarters in which Speaker 
O’Neill was covered in above average fashion, typically at a rate of 10 to 20 
stories per quarter. Between 1987 and 1989 (which saw the departure of 
O’Neill and the beginning and end of the Wright speakership), we see several 
quarters in which ABC coverage of the Speaker was well above average; 
such trends die down in the early 1990s during the Foley speakership. The 
mid 1990s and the Gingrich speakership are particularly fruitful years for 
network news coverage of the Speaker, but by mid-1997 attention for the 
Speaker declines once more and remains well below average until late in the 
2000s (with the beginning of the Pelosi speakership). Speaker Television 
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Coverage is at its highest in the first quarter of 1995, when ABC ran 67 news-
casts in which Speaker Gingrich was discussed; this period saw over 7 times 
the quarterly average of attention afforded the Speaker).
Examining the Speaker Cable Coverage series, we see quarters well above 
average (6 stories per quarter being average) in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 
during the Gingrich speakership. Similarly to our series of ABC News cover-
age, we see several years of below average attention paid to the Speaker 
between 1999 and 2006 during the Hastert speakership before the late 2000s 
and the Pelosi speakership brought with them a handful of quarters in which 
the Speaker once again becomes a topic of CNN’s attention. The series peaks 
in late 1995 with 35 CNN stories on Speaker Gingrich; this level of attention 
amounts to nearly 6 times the quarterly average across the series. As with our 
two newspaper series, we see a remarkable similarity in the extent to which 
ABC and CNN cover the Speaker; across the 15 years in which examine both 
series, said series are correlated at .85.
Across both figures capturing our four media coverage variables, we see a 
handful of strong commonalities. Both of the newspaper series as well as our 
ABC News series see several points across the early to mid 1980s where 
Speaker O’Neill receives coverage at rates slightly above the quarterly average. 
These three series also have well above average peaks in the late 1980s during 
the Wright speakership. All four series rise noticeably in the mid 1990s during 
the Gingrich speakership and in the late 2000s during the Pelosi speakership. It 
is also clear that the Post, AP, and ABC series see little attention paid to the 
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Speaker early in the 1990s during the Foley speakership, and all four series 
decline sharply early in the 2000s during the Hastert speakership.
Modeling Speaker Coverage
To test the relationship between the framework of governing, shocks to the 
system, legislative outcomes, and levels of newspaper and television coverage 
over time, we utilize error correction modeling. Error correction models allow 
us to determine both short-run (i.e., contemporaneous) and long-run impacts 
of our independent variables on levels of media coverage over time. As illus-
trated by authors like DeBoef and Keele (2008) and Kelly (2005), such a 
modeling choice can be utilized in a variety of situations. In fact, as these 
authors show, choosing error correction over, for example, distributed lag 
modeling or other modeling choices, allows for a more general model that 
does not impose unnecessary and potentially unfounded restrictions on the 
relationships being examined.12 Error correction modeling also allows insight 
into potential relationships beyond simply examining a unit change in an 
independent variable driving change in a dependent variable during the same 
time period; we can determine, as Kelly and Enns (2010) put it, the potential 
for “nearly immediate impact” as well as “effects . . . distributed over time 
such that the full effect is not felt all at once” (p. 863). We can determine not 
only if one variable significantly impacts another contemporaneously, but also 
to what extent across future quarters. Table 1 displays the findings of our 
initial inquiry into what drives newspaper coverage of the Speaker.
Table 1 examines the effect of framework, shock, and legislating variables 
on The Washington Post and The Associated Press coverage of Speakers of 
the House. Looking first at what drives Post coverage, we find that polariza-
tion within the House itself matters. In the short run, the greater the distance 
between the average House Republican and House Democrat, the higher the 
level of coverage the Speaker will receive. Given that the DW-Nominate 
scale on which the variable is based ranges from -1 to 1, a shift upward of 
one in the distance between average party members would be massive and 
unlikely; as such, considering how smaller shifts might matter makes more 
intuitive sense.13 If the parties in the House moved 0.1 further apart on the 
DW-Nominate scale, we would expect the Speaker to receive approximately 
165 additional stories in the period where movement occurs. We might take 
the relationship between polarization and Speaker newspaper coverage to be 
proof that potential conflict between partisan actors within the framework 
draws the spotlight toward Speakers expected to be at the core of said con-
flict, either leading the charge or managing tumult. Speakers must manage 
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the widely different approaches to the political game being played by parti-
sans in the House. We see no long-run component to the significant relation-
ship; polarization only matters in an immediate sense and then disappears in 
terms of effects.14
Shocks to the system directly involving the Speaker himself or herself also 
clearly drive Post coverage of the Speaker. We see positive and significant 
effects on story volume of a change in party control of the speakership. New 
Speakers representing new party control (in this study, Speakers Gingrich 
Table 1. Explaining Newspaper Coverage of the Speaker of the House: An Error-
Correction Model.
Post coverage AP coverage
 Long run Short run Long run Short run
Predictor Effects Effects Effects Effects
House polarization 5.05 1656.08* -19.58 1765.53*
 (23.46) (369.18) (24.87) (395.54)
House/presidency division 9.03 8.59 13.02 14.23
 (7.83) (20.48) (8.58) (21.96)
House/senate division 2.73 -5.03 0.93 -20.33
 (8.13) (18.75) (8.70) (20.12)
Change in control 201.83* 272.26* 196.25* 190.12*
 (50.04) (38.82) (53.87) (41.87)
Speaker scandal 20.99 92.17* 64.44* 122.37*
 (13.86) (18.91) (15.76) (20.29)
House scandal -2.53 6.76 -5.44 8.26
 (8.69) (13.30) (9.37) (14.28)
Bills become laws -0.21* 0.02 -0.31* -0.04
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
Overrides 6.26 5.03 4.60 2.65
 (11.56) (8.27) (12.42) (8.90)
Story volume
t-1
-0.35* -0.47*  
 (0.06) (0.07)  
Constant 23.41 44.42
 (22.56) (24.39)
N 135 135  
R-Squared .71 .64  
Note: DVs = number of Speaker newspaper stories per quarter. Both newspaper series run 
from 1977:1 to 2010:4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*= p < .05.
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and Pelosi fit this role) should be incredibly newsworthy; they may bring new 
personalities, new styles of leadership, and new relationships with fellow 
members and the media to the table. Change in leadership in general attracts 
the types of media norms Graber (2010) noted; these changes bring with 
them a historic element as well. Changes in party control of the speakership 
may also mean new strategic choices for the media to cover. They may also 
involve individuals less well known at first from previous Speakers, so a 
flood of biographical stories might be expected. In essence, newness of 
change in party control hand in hand with newness of the individual wielding 
that control wins coverage. This relationship has a contemporaneous compo-
nent (the quarter in which control shifts sees a boost of approximately 272 
Speaker stories) as well as a long-run component. Table 2 teases out that 
long-run component over the next three quarters.15
Table 2 illustrates significant long-run impacts on newspaper coverage of 
the Speaker of the House by The Washington Post and The Associated Press. 
When it comes to the long-run effects of a change in party control of the 
House, we see an increase of 202 stories in quarter t+1, 141 stories in quarter 
t+2, and 92 stories in quarter t+3. This long run significance is not surprising; 
after all, the impact on legislating and governing of a different party taking 
over control of the House is something that has the potential to extend longer 
than the first 3 months in power. Such transitions should continue to provide 
for interesting copy to journalists on the congressional beat. We should also 
note that the somewhat small error coefficient (estimated at -0.35) means this 
effect (and other significant long-run effects of predictors on Post coverage) 
should dissipate slowly across future quarters.
Another shock to the system of governing in the House that drove Post 
coverage upward was the presence of a Speaker scandal. Quarters in which 
Speakers were under ethics investigations saw just over 92 more stories on 
the Speaker than quarters without. Such a relationship suggests that newspa-
pers were clearly (and unsurprisingly given the modern media’s focus on 
Table 2. Long-Run Effects on Newspaper Coverage of the Speaker.
Predictor Newspaper t+1 t+2 t+3
Change in control Post 202 141 92
Bills become laws Post -0.21 -0.14 -0.09
Change in control AP 196 104 55
Speaker scandal AP 64 34 18
Bills become laws AP -0.31 -0.16 -0.09
Note: Effects above 1 rounded off to the nearest whole number.
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conflict, the negative, and the potentially salacious) interested in the troubles 
Speakers Wright and Gingrich faced in grappling with ethics charges. This 
relationship is strictly short-run in nature however. It has no lasting effect 
beyond the investigation.
One final relationship to note when it comes to Post coverage is the sig-
nificant long-run relationship between the process of turning bills into laws 
and attention afforded the Speaker. This relationship is a negative one, signi-
fying that that more productive Congress is, the less coverage the Speaker 
receives across future quarters. The long-run impact of this relationship (as 
seen in Table 2) across time periods t+1, t+2, and t+3 leads to approximately 
0.21, 0.14, and 0.09 fewer Speaker stories respectively for every 1 bill that 
becomes law. Such findings suggest that the media may not be as interested 
in talking about a Speaker doing his or her job (or the Speaker’s role in legis-
lative productivity) so much as they are interested in talking about periods of 
divisiveness or changes in the chamber (as seen in the significance of afore-
mentioned predictors). This finding might fit with the previously discussed 
media norm of journalists being less willing to cover policy.
Moving to columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, we see an incredibly similar picture 
when it comes to explaining what drives coverage of the Speaker by The 
Associated Press as we did in looking at coverage of the Speaker by The 
Washington Post. We see a positive and significant short-run effect of polar-
ization on AP coverage of the Speaker. The more polarized the House is, the 
more coverage the Speaker receives. An increase in distance between the two 
parties in the House of 0.1 on the DW-Nominate scale brings forth approxi-
mately 177 more stories on the Speaker by The Associated Press. Said effect 
is slightly larger for the AP than it is for the Post. As with the Post though, 
there appears to be no long run component to this relationship either.
As with the previous model gauging the effects of shock-based predictors 
on Speaker coverage in The Washington Post, we see that said predictors are 
essential to explaining The Associated Press’s focus on the Speaker as well. 
A change in which party controls the speakership has both short- and long-
run positive and significant effects on AP coverage of the Speaker. Quarters 
in which control of the speakership shifts from one party to the other see an 
increase of just over 190 Speaker stories. This contemporaneous effect is 
slightly smaller when it comes to AP coverage in comparison to Post cover-
age. In the long-run (as illustrated in Table 2), we see an additional 196 
Speaker stories in t+1, an additional 104 in t+2, and an additional 55 in t+3. 
Comparing the long-run dynamics between the Post and AP, we find that the 
impact of a change in party control of the speakership on coverage over 
future quarters is stronger with the Post than with The Associated Press. This 
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can be explained by both the stronger effect in t+1 for the Post as well as the 
higher error coefficient (-0.47) for the AP.
Scandal involving the Speaker also shifts The Associated Press’s spot-
light. We see a contemporaneous increase of approximately 122 stories in 
quarters where the Speaker is the subject of an ethics committee investiga-
tion. Unlike with The Washington Post’s approach to scandal, however, with 
The Associated Press we see a significant long-run component as well. This 
long-run effect is illustrated further in Table 2. Speaker scandal drives The 
Associated Press’s attention to the Speaker across future quarters; t+1 sees 64 
more Speaker stories, t+2 sees 34 more Speaker stories, and t+3 sees 18 more 
Speaker stories.
One last predictor that shapes AP attention paid to the Speaker is the process 
of bills becoming laws. As with The Washington Post, we see a negative and 
significant long run relationship between lawmaking and Speaker coverage. 
The more bills that become laws, the less attention The Associated Press pays 
to the Speaker across future quarters. The last row of Table 2 shows t+1, t+2, 
and t+3 impacts of -0.31, -0.16, and -0.09 respectively. Comparing this long 
run effect with that of the Post, we see that in quarter t+1, legislating has a 
stronger effect on decreasing coverage of the Speaker for The Associated Press, 
but due to the differing error coefficients, by quarter t+3 the effects are exactly 
the same; were we to push even further into the future to t+4 and beyond, we 
would find the impact would be stronger for the Post than for the AP.
Across both newspaper models, we see some commonalities when it 
comes to what does not drive coverage of the Speaker of the House. Divided 
government in both forms (division in party affiliation between the Speaker 
and either the President or the Senate Majority Leader) does not shift the 
spotlight onto or away from the Speaker. Veto overrides do not lead to higher 
or lower levels of newspaper coverage of the Speaker. Finally, scandals 
involving multiple members of the House do not push The Washington Post 
and The Associated Press to focus more or less on the Speaker than in other 
quarters.
We now move to a framework, shock, and legislating-based explanation of 
television coverage of the Speaker on the part of both network newscasts 
(ABC) and cable newscasts (CNN). We begin with Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 
that capture short- and long-run predictors of network news coverage of the 
Speaker from 1977 through 2010. Immediately, we see similarities to the previ-
ous models attempting to explain newspaper coverage of the Speaker of the 
House. Once again, polarization matters. The more polarized the House of 
Representatives is in terms of the distance between parties, the more attention 
the Speaker receives from network newscasts like those produced by ABC. 
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Such a relationship is not unexpected; as argued earlier, polarization should 
bring with it conflict attractive to media and the Speaker must find ways to 
maneuver amidst said conflict. The state of the framework in which the Speaker 
wields power matters. This relationship has both short- and long-run compo-
nents (marking the only instance where polarization is significant in the long 
run). Were Democrats and Republicans in the House to move 0.1 further apart 
on the DW-Nominate scale, it would lead to slightly over 29 more Speaker 
stories, an amount well above the quarterly average on ABC. Interestingly, 
Table 3. Explaining Television Coverage of the Speaker of the House: An Error-
Correction Model.
ABC coverage CNN coverage
 Long run Short run Long run Short run
Predictor Effects Effects Effects Effects
House polarization -15.49* 294.33* 7.95 188.54
 (4.79) (71.73) (24.86) (161.80)
House/presidency division 2.03 1.62 1.47 -3.25
 (1.49) (3.97) (2.80) (6.04)
House/senate division 0.30 -0.71 -2.01 -2.29
 (1.57) (3.64) (2.79) (4.75)
Change in control 32.08* 26.57* 13.19 9.91
 (9.84) (7.59) (15.31) (13.60)
Speaker scandal 10.24* 18.91* 8.94* 2.47
 (2.71) (3.69) (3.58) (5.88)
House scandal -0.76 -0.09 1.27 -0.81
 (1.69) (2.58) (2.41) (6.44)
Bills become laws -0.06* -0.01 -0.03 0.01
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Overrides 4.65* 2.48 0.02 -0.56
 (2.26) (1.60) (3.44) (2.42)
Story volume
t-1
-0.82* -0.88*  
 (0.08) (0.15)  
Constant 18.58* -3.44
 (4.80) (23.99)
N 135 60  
R-Squared .66 .53  
Note: DVs = number of Speaker television stories per quarter. ABC series runs from 1977:1 
to 2010:4; CNN series runs from 1995:4 to 2010:4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*= p < .05.
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however, the long-run relationship between polarization and ABC coverage of 
the Speaker is negative. Table 4 displays the nature of this relationship across 
subsequent quarters.
The first row of Table 4 illustrates the impact of polarization on ABC cov-
erage of the Speaker across quarters t+1, t+2, and t+3. We see a 1-unit change 
in polarization leads to 16 fewer stories in t+1, 3 fewer stories in t+2, and 0.5 
fewer stories in t+3. Given what has been previously stated about the nature 
of the polarization variable, however, the real world effects of polarization on 
ABC coverage of the Speaker are even smaller across future quarters. A more 
likely 0.1-unit increase would lead to 1.6, 0.3, and .05 fewer stories across the 
subsequent three quarters following the change. This effect is significant but 
incredibly small (and incredibly quick to dissipate given an error coefficient 
of -0.82). The direction of this effect could be explained by strong positive 
initial interest in changing polarization, followed by slightly decreasing inter-
est when that change in polarization becomes the status quo.
We also see that a change in which party holds the position of Speaker also 
brings with it network news attention. This shock to the system of governing 
in the House, where control of the speakership changes hands from one party 
to the other, brings with it a contemporaneous boost of just under 27 stories. 
We see that this effect is not just a short-run effect, but that it also spurs cov-
erage across future quarters. New Speakers from parties just taking control 
receive higher levels of network news attention well after the change in who 
holds the position has taken place. Impacts across the first year of a new 
Speaker’s rise to power are small but significant ones. Teasing out the long 
run effect of a change in Speaker over the next three quarters in Table 4, we 
would see a t+1 impact of 32 stories, a t+2 impact of 6 stories, and a t+3 
impact of 1 story. Such effects are noticeably smaller than they were when it 
came to newspaper coverage, but the long-run significance of this relation-
ship makes apparent the idea that the novelty and excitement of a change in 
Table 4. Long-Run Effects on Television Coverage of the Speaker.
Predictor Network t+1 t+2 t+3
House polarization ABC -16 -3 -0.50
Change in control ABC 32 6 1
Speaker scandal ABC 10 2 0.34
Bills become laws ABC -0.06 -0.01 -0.002
Overrides ABC 5 1 0.15
Speaker scandal CNN 9 1 0.13
Note: Effects above 1 rounded off to the nearest whole number.
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which party holds this position can attract television news attention and hold 
it into the future. The newness and strategic elements of a different party 
controlling the speakership hold sway.
As with our previously discussed newspaper models, Speaker scandal has 
a positive and significant effect on network news coverage of the Speaker of 
the House. Both the Wright and Gingrich ethics woes moved network news 
as well as newspapers to pay added attention. In Table 3, we see that quarters 
in which the Speaker is the subject of an ethics investigation see a contempo-
raneous impact of approximately 19 stories with ABC News. These scandals 
had long-run effects as well. Table 4 illustrates that this impact is nearly 
halved in quarter t+1 (to 10 additional stories) and disappears rather quickly 
across the subsequent two quarters (with impacts of 2 and 0.34 stories in t+2 
and t+3 respectively). It is clear that scandal involving high profile leaders 
like the Speaker of the House draws and holds the interest of network news.
Once more, we also see lawmaking have a negative and significant impact 
on Speaker coverage; once more as well, this impact is solely a long-run 
impact. The fourth row of Table 4 breaks down this effect across three future 
quarters and shows that with effects of -0.06, -0.01, and -0.002, such effects 
on network news are incredibly small and incredibly quick to dissipate. 
However, it should be noted that this is the third model in a row where we see 
long-run negative and significant effects of lawmaking on Speaker coverage, 
suggesting once more that there is something to be said for the idea that the 
media are less interested in the Speaker the more Congress is turning bills 
into laws.
Interestingly, however, the network news model delivers the first (and 
only) evidence that overrides might significantly shape when the media spot-
light shines on the Speaker of the House. When the House of Representatives 
overrides a veto, the Speaker of the House receives significantly more atten-
tion than normal from ABC News. This coverage, surprisingly, is not con-
temporaneous, but happens instead across future quarters. As Table 4 
illustrates, the Speaker sees an additional 5 stories in quarter t+1 following an 
override, an additional 1 story in quarter t+2, and an additional 0.15 stories in 
quarter t+3. Perhaps the presence of such legislative events slowly orients the 
media toward reassessing the Speaker’s place in the system of lawmaking; 
overrides may send a signal to the media that the Speaker is a stronger player 
worthy of more attention in the future.
Finally, we attempt to use our framework, shock, and legislative outcome-
based predictors to explain CNN coverage of the Speaker. In columns 3 and 
4 of Table 3, we track the short- and long-run effects on coverage from the 4th 
quarter of 1995 through the end of 2010. Interestingly, our findings here do 
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not fit as well with the findings from models explaining Speaker coverage in 
The Washington Post, The Associated Press, and ABC News already dis-
cussed. Polarization, change in which party holds the speakership, and bills 
becoming laws, three variables that at times significantly predicted when 
Speakers would or would not receive the spotlight from print and network 
news, do not seem to drive the agenda of cable news during this time period. 
Previously insignificant predictors like House scandal and divided govern-
ment situations also fail to shape when CNN covers the Speaker and when 
CNN does not. What does drive CNN’s coverage of the Speaker of the House 
is our Speaker scandal variable. It does so only in the long run, and this 
impact across future quarters is spelled out in the final row of Table 4. We see 
that scandal involving the Speaker leads to 9 more stories in t+1, 1 more story 
in t+2, and an impact less than 1 in quarter t+3; this impact declines sharply 
due to an error correction coefficient of -0.88. This is the third instance (out 
of 4 models overall) in which ethics investigations involving the Speaker 
have had long-run impacts on how the media treat the Speaker. Examining 
this CNN coverage model as a whole, we include these mostly null findings 
to tease out the idea that, when it comes to the Speaker, not all news sources 
apparently have the same definition of what is newsworthy. This model illus-
trates the idea that cable news coverage of Speakers appears to be driven 
much less by the types of considerations that drove coverage undertaken by 
sources like network news, newspapers, and news agencies like the AP.
Explaining The Shifting Spotlight: Speaker 
Coverage Versus Presidential Coverage
We now have a grasp on the types of predictors that explain when the 
Speaker of the House receives attention from newspapers like The Washington 
Post, news agencies like The Associated Press, network newscasts like those 
on ABC, and cable newscasts like those on CNN. But what of the Speaker 
and the broader media agenda? The Speaker may stand head and shoulders 
over the average member of Congress in terms of a share of the spotlight, 
but, as discussed earlier, that share pales in comparison to the share received 
by the President. Figure 3 illustrates just that.
Figure 3 tracks presidential coverage and Speaker coverage by The 
Washington Post between 1977 and 2010.16 We see quite clearly that during 
most quarters, Speaker coverage in The Washington Post pales in comparison 
to presidential coverage. In the average quarter in fact, the President receives 
11 times as much attention from the print media as does the Speaker. We also 
see, however, that the gap between the two is not constant but seemingly 
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changes (and sometimes wildly) from one quarter to the next. In some quar-
ters, this chasm between the spotlight shone on the two leaders is much 
greater; for example, in the first quarter of 1993, President Clinton received 
nearly 50 times as much print coverage as Speaker Foley did. Two years later, 
however, we see a handful of quarters in which President Clinton received 
less than twice as much coverage as Speaker Gingrich did, a massive shift in 
the media’s agenda. How well might the predictors discussed so far, the 
broader framework in which Speakers operate, the shocks to governing in the 
House, and the legislative outcomes from the House, explain the shifting 
disparity between consideration on the part of the media paid to the Speaker 
and to the President? Given our findings so far, we might expect that polar-
ization, change in control, Speaker scandal, and lawmaking might be key.
Table 5 displays the results of an error correction model testing the effects 
of framework, shock, and legislative outcome predictors on the ratio of 
Speaker newspaper coverage to presidential newspaper coverage. We see 
clearly that some of the lessons learned in attempting to explain Speaker 
coverage in general are also applicable in explaining the extent to which the 
spotlight on the Speaker shines a bit more or less brightly when compared to 
the spotlight on the President. We see that polarization is a key predictor of 
the ratio between Speaker coverage and presidential coverage. The further 
apart that Democrats and Republicans are in terms of their party position on 
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the DW-Nominate scale, the more the disparity between Speaker coverage 
and presidential coverage is diminished. If we consider the concept of a 0.1 
unit increase in the distance between parties in the House, we see a world in 
which the ratio of Speaker coverage to presidential coverage increases by 
0.16. The effects here are only short-run in nature. Such effects speak to the 
impacts of polarization discussed earlier; the gap between Speaker coverage 
and presidential coverage might shrink because of the boost polarization 
gives to the spotlight on the Speaker. When the House is more polarized, the 
Speaker must manage this potential and real conflict, elevating the role of the 
Speaker and putting the Speaker on a more equal footing with the President.
Table 5. Explaining Speaker Coverage Versus Presidential Coverage, 1977-2010: An 
Error-Correction Model.
Long run Short run
Predictor Effects Effects
House polarization 0.009 1.601*
 (0.027) (0.430)
House/presidency division 0.014 0.037
 (0.009) (0.024)
House/senate division -0.008 -0.022
 (0.009) (.022)
Change in control 0.207* 0.277*
 (0.059) (0.045)
Speaker scandal 0.011 0.087*
 (0.016) (0.022)
House scandal -0.004 0.005
 (0.010) (0.015)
Bills become laws -0.0002* 0.0001
 (0.0001) (0.0001)
Overrides 0.011 0.009
 (0.014) (0.010)
Story volume
t-1
-0.343*  
 (0.061)  
Constant 0.027
 (0.026)
N 135  
R-Squared .68  
Note: DV = Ratio of speaker newspaper stories to presidential newspaper stories per quarter 
Ratio series runs from 1977:1 to 2010:4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*= p < .05.
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We also find that a shock to the system like change in party control of the 
House of Representatives has an effect on the ratio of Speaker coverage to 
presidential coverage. Given the interest on the part of the media in novelty, 
how new players from different parties will not just affect legislation but also 
affect the way the game, as Patterson (1994) and Weaver (1972) put it, is 
played, we should not be surprised that quarters in which new Speakers from 
parties now in the majority rise to power are quarters in which the ratio 
between Speaker and presidential coverage might shift. In quarters in which 
this control changes, the ratio of Speaker coverage to presidential coverage 
increases by 0.28. Such impacts might be driven by the fact that new party 
control is an inherently new storyline for the media to follow. Given the timing 
of our changes in control in this study (1995, 2007), the change in the ratio 
might also be driven by the contrast of new story lines in the House (dealing 
with Speakers Gingrich and Pelosi) versus old story lines in the White House 
(given that both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush were not new to their 
offices at the same time). Another possible explanation for the impact of 
change on this ratio might lie in the weakness of both presidencies during the 
time in which party change in the House occurred; both changes in control 
were seen as rebuking the administration and the President’s party to some 
extent. Speakers representing strong and different new ways of governing 
took hold of the gavel. Media interest in such changes in comparison to media 
interest in the presidency might be further heightened as a result. This contem-
poraneous effect is not the only effect of a change in party control on the ratio 
of coverage; we also see long-run implications for said ratio. Such long-run 
implications are displayed in Table 6.
Here we see that a change in party control of the House affects the ratio of 
Speaker coverage to presidential coverage in noteworthy ways in at least the 
year following said change in control. The impact of this change on the ratio 
of coverage in t+1, t+2, and t+3 is 0.21, 0.14, and 0.09 respectively. The 
excitement and novelty of a change in leadership (and the anticipation of how 
said leadership might wield power and react to those in the House, in Congress 
as a whole, and in government more broadly speaking) makes the Speaker a 
more competitive player in the race for media attention, and this competition 
Table 6. Long-Run Effects on the Speaker-President Coverage Ratio.
Predictor t+1 t+2 t+3
Change in control 0.21 0.14 0.09
Bills become laws -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.00007
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matters not just when the change occurs, but also across future quarters. An 
error correction coefficient of -0.34 ensures the effect will be somewhat slow 
to dissipate over time, suggesting small yet significant impact much longer 
into the future than t+3. New Speakers like Gingrich and Pelosi representing 
a change in control remained newsworthy in comparison to the President not 
just when they took office, but for many quarters afterward.
Speaker scandal also lessens the typical gulf between Speaker coverage 
and presidential coverage. We see in Table 5 that quarters in which Speakers 
are under ethics investigation like those faced by Speakers Wright and 
Gingrich are quarters in which the ratio of Speaker coverage to presidential 
coverage increases by 0.09. This effect of scandal involving the Speaker is 
solely a contemporaneous one. This once again sends the signal that scandal 
involving the Speaker drives media narratives. This may be the rare case, 
however, in which a Speaker does not want his or her profile to rise in com-
parison to that of the President in the eyes of the media and the minds of the 
general public. Here the shifting spotlight clearly works against the Speaker; 
the Speaker may be more of a media rival to the President in these time peri-
ods, but for all the wrong reasons and in a way that is fleeting and potentially 
weakens rather than consolidates power.
Finally, we once more see the lack of coverage-based benefits to turning 
bills into laws for the Speaker of the House. Table 5 reveals a long-run nega-
tive and significant effect of lawmaking on the ratio between Speaker cover-
age and presidential coverage. The more bills that become laws, the poorer 
the Speaker fares in comparison to the President in the battle for the media 
spotlight. Table 6 reveals, however, that the impact of this relationship across 
future quarters is an incredibly small one. Still, it becomes clearer looking 
across multiple models that legislative accomplishments in terms of raw 
numbers do not benefit the Speaker in terms of media attention; in fact, they 
seem to penalize the Speaker. Turning bills into laws shifts the spotlight away 
from the Speaker and decreases the Speaker’s ability to rival the President for 
said spotlight. Once more as in previous models attempting to explain cover-
age more generally, elements like divided government and broader House 
scandals have no effect whatsoever on the ratio between Speaker coverage 
and presidential coverage.
Discussion
What broader lessons might we take away from our examination of media 
coverage of the Speaker of the House over time? Although no single predictor 
is significantly related in the exact same way across our Speaker Newspaper 
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(as expressed through the Post and AP), Speaker Network Television, and 
Speaker Cable Television models, as well as the ratio between Speaker cover-
age and presidential coverage, we do see several trends across all attempts to 
explain coverage. The first is that polarization between parties in terms of 
actual voting often helps predict when the Speaker will and will not receive 
coverage from the media. Polarization shapes the agenda of Post and AP 
newspaper coverage, ABC coverage, and the ratio between Speaker and 
presidential coverage. The broader takeaway point from the significance of 
polarization is clear: when partisans become even more partisan and different 
in how they act, the Speaker takes on a greater amount of the spotlight as the 
figurehead who must manage (and at times even drives) the conflict inherent 
to parties acting in distinctly different ways. We might argue that Speakers do 
not necessarily only win coverage like Sellers (2002) discusses in his exami-
nation of similar attempts by party leaders, but that the framework helps them 
win it. The framework elevates the Speaker, forcing the Speaker to manage 
partisan conflict within the House. This in turn draws in a media consistently 
interested in conflict and consistently interested in how the political game is 
being played. Seeing as politicians in Congress are becoming more polarized, 
the effects of polarization on coverage here have the potential to benefit 
Speaker efforts to become more public into the future. How leaders like the 
Speaker of the House work within this framework might go a long way to 
determining to what extent the increasingly public speakership that Harris 
(1998) described remains increasingly public. Given the nature of our figures 
here, we might even want to further analyze how we measure the concept of 
a public speakership (or at least acknowledge that there are ebbs and flows in 
coverage of the Speaker in modern times rather than constant upward move-
ment); such a finding fits with a broader theme argued for by authors like 
Malecha and Reagan (2004). The speakership may be more public in terms of 
action, but that does not necessarily guarantee a spotlight. The framework in 
which the Speaker operates conditions the spotlight, as do shocks to the sys-
tem and outcomes.
We might also conclude, based on our five models in total, that speaker-
ship coverage is driven by shocks to the system of governing in the House. 
Changes in who holds the speakership position driven by a new party taking 
over power spur coverage in three of our four media models and close the gap 
between attention afforded the Speaker and the President. Such change brings 
a new (and historic) narrative to the table. It allows the media to tell a new 
story. It allows for a discussion of new strategy (and perhaps a comparison to 
old strategy). It meets and crosses the threshold for what the media deem 
newsworthy. It is clear that the rise of Speakers Gingrich and Pelosi changed 
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the standard operating procedure of the mass media, and did so in ways that 
lasted not just for the few months after taking over, but for several subsequent 
quarters. So too do shocks to the system directly involving the Speaker affect 
the story lines the media produce. Scandals linked to ethics violations affected 
media coverage conducted by newspapers, networks, and cable, and also put 
the Speaker on a more even playing field with the President in terms of the 
coverage ratio. Scandals fit neatly into broader lessons about the mass media, 
namely that on the job and/or personal problems involving those in power 
should be and are fodder for the media to dissect (Sabato, 2000). This dissec-
tion is not only immediate, but also continues to develop over time in print 
and on television.
One last conclusion that becomes clear after an examination of each of our 
models in total is that, in terms of winning and holding the media’s attention, 
the creation of new laws does not appear to benefit the Speaker. Across 
almost every model, the more bills that become laws, the less the Speaker is 
in the spotlight. Perhaps this is the result of a modern media that does not find 
lawmaking or the Speaker’s role in lawmaking as interesting as it does the 
Speaker’s attachment to the conflictual or the novel in the world of politics. 
Perhaps the Speaker’s media presence grows not from seeing bills become 
laws, but instead from seeing bills merely passed by the House. On the other 
hand, perhaps the Speaker himself or herself is not maximizing the potential 
gains of helping create laws. This might represent a relatively untapped ave-
nue for winning coverage. It is clear that the day-to-day process of legislative 
success does not seem to benefit the Speaker’s media profile.
More broadly speaking, our findings here also lend further credence to the 
idea posited by Graber (2010) that media norms drive how politics and politi-
cians are covered. Individuals like the Speaker try to win coverage (and, based 
on the work of those like Peters, 1990, 1999; Peters & Rosenthal, 2010; 
Sellers, 2002, 2010; and Sinclair, 2000, we know such efforts are increasing 
and evolving), but the norms journalists utilize may stand as roadblocks in the 
path Speakers wish to take to accomplish their media goals and enjoy the per-
sonal, policy, and partisan fruits of increased attention. The framework, 
shocks, and legislating are three such types of roadblocks. Moving forward, 
the next step in examining what shapes speakership coverage over time might 
be to determine how we can better explain why some specific individual 
Speakers are better than others at navigating these roadblocks. Moving beyond 
looking at single Speakers or single moments in time, might these relation-
ships be explained by things like broader patterns of media entrepreneurship? 
How might some of these Speakers fare better or worse at handling the media? 
Is some of this driven by differing personalities? Can differing long-run effects 
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be explained by what Speakers do to hold onto the spotlight once it shines 
brightly upon them? Elements like these might be easy to discuss anecdotally 
but difficult to quantify over time. Ideally, subsequent iterations of research of 
this ilk will begin to inquire into how such elements might be better operation-
alized. Another path for research in this area might inquire more deeply into 
why similar patterns emerged between Speaker newspaper and network tele-
vision coverage but different patterns emerged in examining cable television 
coverage. In other words, what does explain when CNN, MSNBC, and FOX 
cover the Speaker if the predictors used here fall short (as they did in the case 
of CNN)? Other issues related to the findings here that might prove interesting 
for future research endeavors include how different measures of polarization 
(such as intraparty differences) might draw the spotlight, how predictors in 
this model might drive coverage of other powerful players like the Senate 
Majority Leader, or how the President’s point of view might drive the ratio 
between levels of coverage across branches, asking how presidential actions 
lead to a stronger or weaker grip on the spotlight.
Until then though, our predictors linked to the political framework, 
shocks to the system, and legislative outcomes do an impressive job of 
explaining widely changing levels of Speaker coverage across multiple 
decades as well as the ratio between Speaker and presidential coverage. It is 
clear that to some extent, leaders like the Speaker can control their own 
media fate and pull attention (and probably additional power) in their direc-
tion, but that time in the spotlight is conditioned by factors like polarization, 
change in control, personal scandal, and lawmaking that, while undoubtedly 
affected by what Speakers do and how Speakers work, ultimately remain 
partly out of a Speaker’s grasp.
Appendix
Speakers of the House, 1977-2010
Listed below are the 6 individuals who served as Speaker of the House dur-
ing the time period examined in this research. Also listed is the length of each 
individual’s tenure as Speaker.
Thomas “Tip” O’Neill (January 4, 1977-January 3, 1987);
Jim Wright (January 6, 1987-June 6, 1989);
Tom Foley (June 6, 1989-January 3, 1995);
Newt Gingrich (January 4, 1995-January 3, 1999);
Dennis Hastert (January 6, 1999-January 3, 2007);
Nancy Pelosi (January 4, 2007-January 3, 2011).
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Notes
 1. A list of the Speakers of the House (as well as their tenures in office) discussed in 
this research is included in the Appendix.
 2. This database can be found at http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. To some 
extent, these measures are not as precise as one might hope; the DW-Nominate 
system measures where the average Democrat and Republican sit on their scale 
every two years rather than over shorter periods of time. Results linking polar-
ization to coverage, therefore, can speak only to congressional sessions to some 
extent rather than quarters as we would ideally want.
 3. This variable captures the investigations of Speakers Wright and Gingrich.
 4. This variable captures Koreagate, ABSCAM, the House Page Affair, House 
Bank, House Post Office, and the Abramoff Lobbying Affair.
 5. Information on the volume of bills becoming laws can be found through search-
ing http://thomas.loc.gov.
 6. Overrides can be found through searching http://thomas.loc.gov.
 7. The database can be found at http://www.lexisnexis.com/news.
 8. We utilize a slightly different technique for gathering AP stories than Post sto-
ries because using the story subject function for AP stories appears to deliver 
an incredibly narrow set of results; for example, using the Lexis-Nexis story 
subject function on Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2007 delivers 1 story, a number 
that appears ludicrous at face value given the Democratic Party takeover of the 
House that year.
 9. The series of newspaper coverage shown in Figure 1 are raw counts of stories per 
quarter. Quarters run from January to March, April to June, July to September, 
and October to December. Media data used in this project are available from the 
authors upon request.
10. The archive can be found at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu.
11. The only exception lies with Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, whose last name 
proved somewhat difficult for the Archive’s search engine due to the apostro-
phe. For O’Neill, we searched for stories with “Thomas” or “Tip” in them, then 
dropped instances not about the Speaker and instances where stories in both 
searches led to double counting.
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12. Comparing our error correction findings in Tables 1, 3, and 5 to, for example, 
findings of distributed lag models using the same variables, reveals much the 
same in terms of findings. Such comparisons speak to the robustness of our find-
ings no matter the modeling choice. We present the error correction results to 
tease out if and where long-run dynamics are present.
13. We replicate this method of considering the effects of polarization for each sub-
sequent model.
14. We should keep in mind though that, because DW-Nominate scores members by 
Congress and not by quarter, changes in this measure happen every two years. 
This makes the distinction between long and short run slightly more complicated. 
In essence, this significant relationship and the relationship between polarization 
and Speaker Television Coverage capture changes from one Congress to the next 
and not precisely one quarter to the next.
15. In tables that display long-run effects, we have rounded said effects to the nearest 
whole story except in cases where the effect is less than 1.
16. Given the previously discussed similarities in coverage over time from one 
medium to the next, we have decided to focus this portion of the analysis on one 
media source, The Washington Post, rather than repeat it across all four sources.
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